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INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the power of CRISPR-the workhorse genetic-editing
system first elucidated in 2012-and the public's interest in it, both as a piece of
science and an ethical battleground. 1 But there has also been extensive interest in the
variety of intellectual property issues surrounding CRISPR, including a heated patent
dispute between two of the technology's originators, Jennifer Doudna (UC Berkeley)
and Emmanuelle Charpentier (Max-Planck), on one side, and Feng Zhang (Broad Institute) on the other. 2 While the intellectual property disputes concerning CRISPR are
far from over-indeed, like Tolstoy's War and Peace, new characters central to the dispute continue to materialize3 -five years of hindsight has given some perspective on
their ethical, legal, and social implications.
This brief essay reviews several of these issues: ( i) difficulties with interinstitutional
collaborations, especially for lucrative 'translational' technologies; (ii) the rise of forprofit 'surrogate' companies to manage university licensing; and (iii) the use of patents
as a means of private governance to prevent potential abuses, such as 'gene drives',
See eg Antonio Regalado, Engineering the Perfect Baby, MIT
TECH.
REv., Mar. 5, 2015,
https:/ /www.technologyreview.com/s/ 535661/ engineering-the-perfect-baby/ [https:/ /perma.cc/AT7TFM8Y] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (discussing public perceptions of CRISPR); see generally CRISPR-CAS: A
LABORATORY MANUAL (Jennifer Doudna & Prashant Mali eds., 2016) (teaching the method of using CRISPR
for gene editing).
See eg Jacob S. Sherkow, What the CRISPR Patent Dispute Is All About, Sci. AM., Dec. 12, 2016,
https: / /blogs.scientificamerican.com/ guest-blog/ what-the-crispr-patent-dispute-is-all-about/
[https: / /
perma.cc/BA88-VUEN] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (synopsizing the CRISPR patent dispute).
See Jon Cohen, CRISPRPatent Battle in Europe Takes a 'Wild' Twist with Surprising Player, Science News, Aug. 4,
2017, http:/ /www.sciencemag.org/ news/2017 /08/ crispr-patent-battle-europe-takes-wild-twist-surprisingplayer [https:/ /perma.cc/SZG3-CHRB J (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (describing a new, fundamental CRIS PR
patent in Europe owned by Millipore Sigma).
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seed-saving restrictions for agriculture, and germ-line human engineering. It concludes
with several observations-and prescriptive recommendations-for patent protection
related to academic, collaborative1 cutting-edge research.
THE CRISPR PATENT DISPUTE
Since the first U.S. patent applications were filed for an engineerable CRISPR system in 20121 the IP landscape has become significantly more crowded1 with several researchers controlling a few significant battlements. To date1 three groups of
scientists have emerged as holders of foundational patents covering CRISPR-Cas9:
Jennifer Doudna (UC Berkeley) and Emmanuelle Charpentier (now at Max-Planck1
but at Umea University1 Sweden, at the time of her contribution to the invention) 1
Feng Zhang (Broad Institute) 1 and Virginijus Sik8nys (Vilnius University, Lithuania).
Contrary to popular belie£ Sikfoys was the first of the three to file a patent application covering his variation on the technology. Sik8nys filed for his patent on March
201 2012, 4 although it did not issue-that is1 it was not formally granted by the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (U.S.P.T.0.)-until May 21 2017. 5 For a number of
reasons, Sikfoys' contributions-both to the science CRISPR and the technology's
patent dispute-have been overlooked. 6 But SikSnys' patent covers using CRISPRCas9 through an in vitro1 pre-assembled Cas9: RNA complex-also known as CRISPR
ribonucleoproteins-an important iteration of the technology for a variety of applications.7
More famously1 Doudna and Charpentier first filed their fundamental patent application covering CRISPR-Cas9 on May 251 2012. 8 Their original patent application
contained over 150 claims-particular ways to practice the invention that defined
the application's boundaries-and was notably unspecific with respect to cell type. 9
Nonetheless1 Doudna and Charpentier's patent attorneys pegged their clients' invention broadly1 as the use of a single-guide RNA to mediate the editing ofgenomic D NA. 10
It was the ease1 flexibility, and precision of this advance that has largely thrust CRIS PR
into the lay lexicon. 11

4

6

7

8

9

10

11

U.S. Patent Application No. 61/613,373 (filed Mar. 20, 2012).
U.S. Patent No. 9,637, 739.
See Sarah Zhang, The Battle over Genome Editi11g Gets Science All Wrong, WIRED, Oct. 4, 2015,
https: / /www.wired.com/2015/ 10 /battle-genome-editing-gets-science-wrong/
[https:/ /perma.cc/R2J 5LKHT] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (expanding on Sik5nys as the 'forgotten' CRISPRscientist).
See egJe Wook Woo, et al., DNA-Free Genome Editing in Plants with Preassembled CRISPR-Cas9 Ribonucleoproteins, 33 NAT. BIOTECH. 1162 (2015) (using the technology in plants).
U.S. Patent Application No. 61/652,086 (filed May 25, 2012).
See Jacob S. Sherkow, The CRISPRPatent Interference Showdown ls On: How Did We Get Here and What Comes
Next?, STAN. CTR. L. B1osc1. BLOG, Dec. 29, 2015, https://law.stanford.edu/2015/12/29/the-crispr-patentinterference-showdown-is-on-how-did-we-get-here-and-what-comes-next/
[https://perma.cc/7WZB-2L44 J (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (summarizing the claims).
See Jacob S. Sherkow, Biotech Trial of the Century Could Determine W110 Owns CRISPR, MIT TECH. REv., Dec.
7, 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/ s/ 603034/biotech-trial-of-the-century-could-determine-whoowns-crispr / [https:/ / perma.cc/3KUU-PD92) (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (recounting Doudna' s attorney's
argument before the U.S.P.T.O.).
See Megan Molteni, CRISPR May Cure All Genetic Disease-One Day, WIRED, June 7, 2017,
https:/ / www.wired.com/2017 / 06/ crispr-may-cure-genetic-disease-one-day/
[https:/ / perma.cc/ Q273PWGF] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (explaining the importance of CRISPR to a lay audience).
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During the pendency of Doudna and Charpentier's application in the USA, Zhang
also filed a U.S. patent application-directed specifically to eukaryotic applications of
CRISPR-Cas9. 12 The principal improvement of Zhang' s methods over his predecessors was the use of a nuclear localization signal and, separately, codon optimization to
natively express Cas9 .13 But Zhang' s attorneys fast tracked his application through the
U.S.P.T.0., a relatively expensive and strategically risky process. 14 As a consequence,
Zhang' s patent-even though it was filed after applications from Doudna, Charpentier,
and Sikfays-was issued first in the USA. 15 That quandary gave rise to the now-famous
patent dispute in the USA, the first round of which was won by Zhang. 16 The remainder
of it is still being appealed; a decision is expected in late 2018. 17
The U.S. interference decision, however, stands apart from the rest of the world. As
detailed-excellently-by Knut J0rgen Egelie and his colleagues at Norwegian University of Science and Technology-the global CRISPR patent landscape is varied. 18
Europe has now officially sided with Doudna and Charpentier over Zhang, although
opposition proceedings at the European Patent Office have just begun. 19 And China,
too, recently sided with Doudna and Charpentier. 20 These conflicting decisions are further complicated by a set of interlocking license agreements from the inventors' biotech
companies, with a great deal of uncertainty playing out in the global commercial sector for CRISPR 21 Unraveling those agreements, and the issues raised by the patenting
of the technology in the first instance, speaks volumes about the values and pitfalls of
patents in the research enterprise.
INTERINSTITUTI ONAL CO LLAB 0 RATION

One notable aspect of the CRISPR patent dispute is that it is, by and large, a dispute between academic research institutions. It pits lawyers representing the University
12
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See U.S. Patent No. 8,697,359 (noting a provisional application date ofDec. 12, 2012).
Id. ('The invention comprehends the expression of two or more gene products being altered and the vectors of
the system further comprising one or more nuclear localization signal( s) (NLS( s) ) .... The invention further
comprehends the Cas9 protein being codon optimized for expression in the eukaryotic cell.').
Petition to Make Special Under Accelerated Examination Program, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/054,414
(Oct. 15, 2013).
Compare U.S. Patent No. 8,697,359 (Zhang's issued patent) with U.S. Patent Application No. 13/842,859
(Doudna and Charpentier's patent application); see also Jacob S. Sherkow, 'Die CRJSPR Patent Interference
Showdown Is On: How Did We Get Here and What Comes Next?, STAN. CTR. L. & B1osc1. BLOG, Dec. 29, 2015,
https: I /law.stanford.edu/2015/12/29 / the-crispr-patent-interference-showdown-is-on-how-did-we-get-hereand-what-comes-next/ [https:/ /perma.cc/7WZB-2L44 J (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (explaining the genesis of
the dispute).
Broad Institute, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Cal., Patent Interference No. 106,048, 2017 WL 657415
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017).
Kevin E. Noonan, Berkeley Files Opening Brief in CRJSPR Appeal, PATENT Docs, July 31, 2017,
http:/ /www.patentdocs.org/2017 /07 /berkeley-files-opening-brief-in-crispr-appeal.html [https://perma.cc/
57GX-8UMX] (accessedNov.13,2017).
KnutJ. Egelie et al., The Emerging Patent Landscape of CRJSPR-Cas Gene Editing Technology, 34 NAT. BIOTECH.
1025, 1025 (2016).
European Patent No. 2,800,811 (filed Mar. 15, 2013); see also Sharon Begley, University of California's
CRJSPR Patent Win in Europe Likely to Be Challenged, STAT NEWS, Mar. 28, 2017, https://www.statnews.
com/2017 /03/28/ crispr-university-of-california-patent/ [https:/ /perma.cc/E8ZB-Q4FF] (accessed Nov.
13, 2017) (reporting on upcoming challenges).
Chinese Patent No. 104,854,241.
Jorge L. Contreras & Jacob S. Sherkow, CRJSPR, Surrogate Licensing, and Scientific Discovery, 355 SCIENCE 698,
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of California against lawyers representing the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard. 22
To be sure, university rivalries are common.23 But because universities share among
themselves a larger mission to create and disseminate knowledge to the public, litigiousness among them has been historically rare. 24
University-against-university patent disputes, like CRISPR, complicate interinstitutional research agreements on several levels. First, they have the potential to chill
formal interinstitutional research collaborations among universities if the institutions
cannot agree on intellectual property issues beforehand.25 Universities may simply be
unwilling to enter into such agreements in the first instance, or, perhaps more perniciously, discourage their faculty from informally developing such networks.26 While the
empirical evidence for such a diminishment in collaborative efforts is slight-difficult
to demonstrate, in part, because it requires the proof of opportunities not taken by
universities-some recent survey data have found that 'institutionally mandated [materials transfer agreements Jput sand in the wheels of a lively system ofintra-disciplinary
exchanges of research tools'.27 Aside from this, there is substantial anecdotal evidence
of institutional difficulties in creating such agreements.28 It stands to reason that, at
least in some instances, these difficulties have ended some collaborations before they
could begin. More immediately, this is a current issue with the CRISPR patent dispute
given some internal dissention between Doudna and Charpentier' s respective institutions concerning the intellectual property involved. Although Doudna and Charpentier filed their joint patent application in 2012, their institutions did not formally assent
to a cross-licensing agreement until December 2016.29 If assenting to a cross-licensing
22

See Broad Institute, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Cal., Patent Interference No. 106,048, 2017 WL 65741 5
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017).
23 See eg GREG EMMANUEL, THE 100-YARD WAR: INSIDE THE 100-YEAR-OLD MICHIGAN-OHIO STATE FOOTBALL
RIVALRY (2005) (writing on the historic rivalry between the University of Michigan and The Ohio State U niversity).
24 See JACOB H. ROOKSBY, T HE BRANDING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 122 (2016) (examining university patent
prosecution and assertion ).
25 J acob S. Sherkow, Pursuit of Profit Poisons Collaboration, 532 NATURE 172, 173 (201 6) .
26 Id.
27

28

29

Zhen Lei, Rakhi Jun eja & Brian D. Wright, Patents Versus Patenting: Implications of Intellectual Property Protection for Biological Research, 27 N AT. BIOTECH. 36, 36 (2009).
See eg GideonD. Markman et al., Innovation Speed: Transferring University Technology to Market, 34 REs. POLY
1058, 1064 (2005 ) (' [ C ]ross-university collaborations . ... may introduce another layer of complexity to
licensing and thus add time to the transfer process. This raises a question about the tradeoffs between the
value of insights derived from inter-university collaboration and the costs incurred due to licensing complexity.'); Mel I. Mendelson & Mark Rajai, Students Patents 011 Inter-University Projects, PROC. AM. Soc'y ENG'R
EDUC. ANN. CONF. & EXPOSITION 6.904.1, 6.904.1- 6.904.2 (2001) (describing the difficulties in establishing a patent agreement for student projects between Loyola Marymount University and East Tennessee State
University); Dianne Nicol & Jane L. N ielsen, Patents and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical Analysis of Issues Facing the Australian Industry, CENTRE FOR LAW AND GENETICS OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 6 105 (2003 ),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2583508 [https: //perma.cc/W978-583Q] (describing interinstitutional IP ten sions among Australian universities) . But see Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence a11d A11ecdotes: A11 Analysis
of Huma 11 Gene Patwting Controversies, 24 NAT. BIOTECH. 109 1, 1093 (2006) ('Finally, the data concerning
the increasing secrecy of university researchers seem to indicate that there may be a conflation of patenting
and commercial and/ or scientific competition as the cause of this trend. It appears that academic researchers
are becoming more secretive, but th at is not shown to be attributable to the patenting process, suggesting that
the solution might not reside in modifying patent policy.').
CRISPR Therapeutics, Intellia Therapeutics, Caribou Biosciences and ERS Genomics A11nou11ce Global
Agreement 011 the Fou11datio11al In tellectual Property for CRISPR/Cas9 Gene Editing Technology,
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agreement for a single piece of technology has proved difficult, it is unclear how the two
institutions will deal with one another on future collaborations.
Second, even with some friction between universities over obtaining patents for
their researchers' work, it has been rare for universities to sue one another regarding
inventorship-until now. In 2011, for instance, the University of Utah sued the MaxPlancklnstitute concerning inventorship over a foundational group ofpatents concerning RNA interference technology. 30 And since 2012, Stanford University and the Chinese University of Hong Kong have battled one another over lucrative patent rights
to noninvasive prenatal genetic diagnostics. 31 That dispute-despite several rounds of
appeals-is still ongoing. 32 Such patent disputes are costly, high stakes, and high profile. And while the CRISPR patent dispute itself is not a cause of such conflict, it has
become emblematic-and potentially prophetic-of the tenor of such disputes today.
Avoiding them in the first instance is a sensible institutional priority. But that sometimes comes at the cost of avoiding one's colleagues. 33
Third, even apart from the administrative institutional level, patent disputes like
these damper the culture of scientific collaboration, clearly something of tremendous
import to modem science. 34 Putting a price on a loosely defined culture of scientific collaboration is difficult-its loss is difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, many of the most
significant breakthroughs of the past century arose in part from a culture of scientific
openness and collegiality.35 Abandoning that in favor of inuring patent rights to researchers from a single institution seems, at best, unwise. Relatedly, it may erode scientists' penchant for honest, ifcritical assessments, oftheir own work among collaborators
and colleagues. A key piece of evidence used in the U.S. CRISPR patent interference
against the University of California was a single one of Doudna's public statements that
her collaborators 'weren't sure if CRISPR/ Cas9 would work in eukaryotes-plant and
animal cells'. 36 That statement has now echoed throughout laboratories across the USA
as a cautionary tale against critical reflections of one's work- at least while patents are
pending. 37
CARIBOU B1osc1., Dec. 16, 2016, http://cariboubio.com/in-the-news/press-releases/ crispr-therapeuticsintellia-therapeutics-caribou-biosciences-and-ers [https:// perma.cc/ T6H G-P6DB].
30 Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften E.V., 851 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
31 Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong, 860 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
32 Id.
33

34
35

36

37

Johan Bruneel, Pablo D'Este & Ammon Salter, Investigating the Factors That Diminish the Barriers to UniversityIndustry Collaboration, 39 REs. PoL'Y 858, 859- 60 (2010) (noting that IP conflicts act as a barrier to collaboration).
See Sherkow, supra note 25, at 173.
See eg Clyde A. Hutchison, III, DNA Sequencing: Bench to Bedside and Beyond, 35 N UCLEIC Acrns REs. 6227,
6230 (2007) (describing the collaboration to engineer DNA sequencing between Maxam and Gilbert); E.M.
T ansey & P .P. Catterall, Monoclonal Antibodies: A Witness Seminar in Contemporary Medical History, 38 MED.
HIST. 322, 327 ( 1994) (describing the collaborative efforts of the discovery of antibodies); James D. Watson
& Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, Origins of the Human Genome Project, 5 FASEB]. 8, 9 (1991 ) (discussing the
collaborative efforts of the Human Genome Project).
Broad Institute, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Cal., Patent Interference N o. 106,048, 2017 WL 657415
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017).
Michael Eisen, Pateuts Are Destroying the Soul of Scirnce, IT Is NOT J UNK (Feb. 20, 2017),
http://www.michaeleisen.org/blog/?p= l981 [https://perma.cc/ 2VME-PUS8] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017)
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Lastly, patent conflicts' hindrance of interinstitutional collaborations may simply
be costly. Today, some research benefits from economies of scale, such as where
expensive equipment can be shared among institutions. 38 The New York Genome Center, for example, is a joint venture among several New York-area research institutions:
NYU, Columbia, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratories, to name a few. 39 This arrangement
allows researchers at these institutions to share a fleet of Illumina X Ten sequencers,
the total cost of which-including operations-runs into the millions of US dollars. 40
Where research funding is diminishing-as is sadly the case in much of the Anglophone
world 41 -universities may foolishly hesitate to engage in similar cost-saving arrangements in the short-sighted hope of avoiding future patent lawsuits. 42 One would hope
that the CRISPR patent dispute teaches others that such myopia isn't warranted.
SURROGATE LICENSING
Interinstitutional tensions aside, the CRISPR patent dispute raises some significant issues concerning patent licensing and commercialization-agreements between
universities and commercial entities over the use and development of CRISPR
In CRISPR's case, both the Broad Institute and the University of California have
employed a system of 'surrogate licensing': 'outsourc[ing] the licensing and commercialization of a valuable patent portfolio to a private company'. 43 It is that
company-rather than university-that takes responsibility for licensing the included
patents to commercial researchers, including biotech startups and large pharmaceutical
developers. 44
At the same time, the surrogate is frequently working to develop the technology itself.45 This is certainly true for CRISPR The University of California has delegated the
entirety of its licensing rights to Doudna' s inventions to Caribou Biosciences, which
in turn has granted an exclusive license to develop human therapies to Intellia Therapeutics.46 The Broad Institute, meanwhile, has employed Editas Medicine as its surrogate for human therapeutics; the institute retains control over non-commercial and

38

39

40

41

42
43

44
45
46

('But this [was J an absolutely true statement that any good scientist would say even if they believed CRlSPR
would work in eukaryotic cells .... Is this the lesson we really want to learn from CRlSPR? That scientists
working in fields with commercial potential should never speak honestly about their work and the scientific
process?').
Karla Hernandez-Villafuerte et al. 1 Economies of Scale and Scope in Publicly Funded Biomedical and Health Research: Evidence from the Literature, 15 HEALTH R.Es. POLY & SYS. 3 ( 2017) (reviewing the sometimes conflicting
evidence for economies of scale in biomedical research).
Institution Founding Members, NEW YORK GENOME CENTER, http://www.nygenome.org/about-us/#our_
members [https:/ /perma.cc/AVA6-9NNA] (accessed Nov. 13 1 2017).
The New York Genome Center Purchases Illumina Hiseq X Ten Sequencing System, NEW YORK GENOME CENTER,
Jan. 221 20141 http://www.nygenome.org/wp-content/uploads/HiSeq-X-Ten-NYGC-Press-Release-FINAL
.pdf; [https://perma.cc/G4KZ-6EAF] Jacob S. Sherkow, Cancer's IP, 96 N.C. L. REv. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 14-16), https:/ /papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstracLid=2928241 (discussing the cost
of sequencing operations).
See Simon Parkin, Brexit Is Quietly Strangling Science, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 81 2017, https:/ /www.bloomberg.
[https:/ /
com/news/features/2017-08-08/brexit-guts-british-science-and-risks-graphene-innovation
perma.cc/9VD9-WVNV] (accessed Nov. 131 2017).
See Sherkow, supra note 25, at 173; RooKSBY, supra note 24 1 at 126.
Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 21 1 at 698.
Id. at 698-99.
Id.
Id.
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non-human therapyuses. 47 Surrogates, therefore,' control a large and lucrative field for
the exploitation of the licensed technology, and have significant freedom both to exploit
it themselves and seek partners and sublicenses'. 48
This system of surrogate licensing-while not unique to CRISPR-sets up several
obvious conflicts. Surrogates may very well be unwilling to sublicense their technology
to smaller biotech companies-who, in a very real sense, are rivals to the surrogate. 49
Smaller companies seeking to develop similar uses of CRISPR to that studied by, say,
Editas are unlikely to receive patent licenses to do so-at least on favorable terms.so
Surrogates are also not invested with the same public duty as their related academic
institutions. Their duties, especially if they are publicly traded companies-as are Editas, Intellia, and Emmanuelle Charpentier'sown company, CRISPR Therapeutics-are
to their shareholders.s 1 In both real and legal terms, this duty tacks toward profit
maximization rather than, say, advancing scientific knowledge or public access to the
downstream products of their research-ideals typically lauded by research institutions. s2 With respect to this conflict between public-facing goals and shareholder value,
Michael Eisner, former CEO of Disney, put it best: 'We have no obligation to make
history. We have no obligation to make art. We have no obligation to make a statement. To make money is our only objective'.s 3 Lastly, surrogate licensing-even when
functioning well-may 'bottleneck' the commercial development of the underlying
technology. s4 Surrogates may grant exclusive sublicenses that are too broad relative to
their licensees' contributionsi this blocks others from developing competing technologies.ss Surrogates may also grant licenses to disease indications or areas of the genome
far greater than any sublicensee can work at any given time. s6 To be sure, bottlenecking is a serious problem with respect to university licensing as well.s 7 But universities
are frequently more invested in nonexclusive licenses to commercial developers than
for-profit surrogates.s 8
ETHICAL LICENSING AND ENFORCEMENT
Most of the commentary on the CRISPR patents has been negative-and, in particular, the negative side of patenting the products of academic research.s 9 But-aside
from money-there are some significant social positives as well. At their core, patents

47
48
49
50
51

Id.
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id.
See Mark]. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism-In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 Bus. L. 977, 993(2013)
(noting the conflict between short-term shareholder value and long-term scientific research).

s2

Id.

53

103 (2000).
Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 21, at 700.
Id.
Id.

54
SS

s6
57

58
59

KIM MASTERS, KEYS TO THE KINGDOM

See Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102 CORNELL L. REv. 271,
279-80 (2017) (noting deadweight losses with exclusive university licensing) .
Id. at 275.
See eg Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 21, at 698; Egelie et al., supra note 18, at 1030-31; Sherkow, supra
note 2S, at 173.
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are rights to exclude others from practicing the claimed invention. 60 The corollary to
this axiom is that patents therefore allow their owners to dictate to the rest of the world
how to use the inventors' technology. 61 This power to direct others' research can be harnessed for societal good. 62 Where the claimed technology raises ethical or social concerns1 patent holders have the right to tell their technologies' users to behave ethically
and to provide access to downstream inventions. 63 In this sense1patents-when used
well-can function as a powerful form of private governance. 64
This is certainly the case with CRISPR1 the ethical and social issues of which have
been explored at length. 65 One potentially problematic use of CRISPRis its use in'gene
drives', a daisy chain of genetic editing that essentially forces future generations to inherit and subsequently pass on only a single variant of a particular gene. 66 The concern,
as detailed by Kevin Esvelt, is that gene drives, because they are forcibly heritable, become difficult to control once put in place. 67 Should later research find negative, unintended effects of the particular genetic variant driven through the population, it may
simply be too late. 68 To that end, Esvelt and others have proposed patenting the use
of CRISPR-based gene drives to1 essentially, prevent others from using the technology without rigorous scientific and ethical controls. 69 The legal mechanics of enforcing
patent protection in this manner leave some gaps that likely need to be addressed. But
Esvelt's proposal suggests1 at a minimum, that patenting controversial technologies is
one possible tool to further their ethical use.
In other cases1 rather than using patents to ethically restrict access to controversial technologies1 patents can be used to ethically promote access to the same. That is,
patent holders can demand licensees promise that they make their technology available
to broad segments of society, and on fair terms.7° This is largely the case with Monsanto's license from the Broad Institute covering the use of CRISPR-Cas9 for a variety
of agricultural purposes. That license essentially requires Monsanto to allow its farmer
customers to save and resew seed from one season to the next, in contrast to some of
60

61

62

63
64

65

66

See 35 U.S.C. 3271 (a) (2012) ('[W]hoeverwithout authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term
of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.').
See Tania Bubela,Jenilee Guebert & Amrita Mishra, Use and Misuse of Material Transfer Agreements: Lessons
in Proportionality from Research, Repositories, and Litigation, 13 PLoS BIOL. e 1002060 ( 20 IS) (linking patents'
greater rights to exclude with the lesser right oflimiting the underlying inventions use-typically through material transfer agreements).
Christi]. Guerrini et al., The Rise of the Ethical License, 35 NAT. BIOTECH. 22, 22 (2017).
Id. at 23.
Id. at 22 ('By prohibiting uses the patent holder deems unethical, a patent license can function as a tool of
private governance.').
See eg Regalado, supra note I.
See Ed Yong, One Man's Plan to Make Sure Gene Editing Doesn't Go Haywire, July II, 2017, ATLANTIC,
https: / /www.theatlantic.com/ science/ archive/2017 /07 /a-scientists-plan-to-protect-the-world-by-changing
-how-science-is-done/ 532962/ [https:/ /perma.cc/WSS8-BWC8] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (discussing
Esvelt' s proposal).

67

Id.

68

Kevin M. Esvelt, Strategies for Responsible Gene Editing, PROJECT SYNDICATE, Jan. 25, 2016, https://www.
project-syndicate.org/ commentary/ crispr-gene-drive-editing-rules-by-kevin-m-esvelt-2016-0 I
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Monsanto's past practices. 71 Requiring this ofMonsanto provides greater access to the
fruits of CRISPR technology to farmers, who would otherwise be required to purchase
expensive new seed each year from Monsanto.72 In the therapeutics context, similar license restrictions could be used, in theory, to require price controls, access plans, or that
research and development funds be used, in part, to develop treatments for neglected
diseases. 73
And, perhaps counterintuitively, patents could also be used to ensure research access to a variety of technologies. Patent holders can publicly commit to refuse to enforce their patents against researchers or academic institutions. In the USA, these frequently take the form of 'patent pledges' - 'commitments made voluntarily by patent
holders to limit the enforcement or other exploitation of their patents'.74 Doing so both
prevents others from patenting-and suing others-on the same technology, and dissuades less ethically minded competitors from entering the field. 75 Patent holders can
also use open licensing systems to researchers interesting in developing and sharing the
technology for the public good. In the CRISPRcontext, this non-commercial use is mediated through a non-profit organization, AddGene, a company that provides access to
CRIS PR constructs and plasmids through a standardized Biological Materials Transfer
Agreement (BMTA). Add Gene's BMTA's contains patent licenses for academic use of
the underlying technology.7 6
To be sure, these restrictions have the potential for abuse. One scientist's ethical restriction is another's unethical impediment to research. The Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation (WARF), for example, owns many patents directed to human embryonic stem cells (hESC), methods of use and propagation and therapies potentially derived from their use. 77 But facing public controversy over the
technology-and a moralistic Congress then threatening to restrict federal funding
covering the technology-WARF has imposed restrictions on its hESC patent licenses
concerning their technology's use in connection 'non-human embryos'. 78 These restrictions have aroused some ire among the scientific community, many of whom view the
limitations not as an ethical fence, but an impermissible walling off of secular research
for religious purposes. 79
Importantly, too, the overreliance on patents as vehicles promoting the ethical uses
of technology may crowd out other equally effective-and less restrictive-forms
of control. Patents, of course, are not the only means of private governance to reign
in ethically unruly technology. The BioBrick Foundation, a research platform for
71
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Id. at 24.
Id.
Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, ]. L. &
BrosCI. 3, 18 (20 17) (noting that health care payers have the information and incentives to impose demands
on drug developers).

J orge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 Aruz. ST. L.J. 543, 546 (2015).
See Id.
76 AddGe11e UBMTA, ADDGENE, https: //www.addgene.org/ term s/ 1047 / [https://perma.cc/ ZG5K-4YFP]
(accessed Nov. 131 2017).
77 John M. Golden, WARF's Stem Cell Patents and Tensions Between Public and Private Sector Approaches to Research,]. L. MED. & ETHICS 314, 314 (Summer 2010).
n Id.at 319.
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75

IO

•

Patent protection for CRISPR

'synthetic biology', famously abandoned patents as a tool for ethical governance in favor of standardized, contractual, materials transfer agreements-namely, the BioBrick
User Agreement (BUA). 80 The BUA itself contains, in essence, ethical
restrictions-notably, § 5, which prohibits 'intentionally harmful, negligent, or
unsafe uses'. 81 VVhile the enforceability of the agreement is questionable, it stands
testament to the possibility of private ethical governance of platform technologies
outside of patent assertion. In any event, the contrast among the WARF hESC patents,
AddGene's BMTA, and the BUA demonstrates that, like CRISPR itself, patents are
tools that can be used for good or for ill. At a minimum, ethically responsible patent
pledges demonstrate the capacity of using patents as a tool for the public good.
CONCLUSIONS
In many ways, the ethical, legal, and social issues of CRISPR patenting are idiosyncratic. It is not often that a ground-breaking genetic engineering technology is invented,
with monumental import to therapy, human reproduction, and social order. 82 And
it is perhaps rarer still that such an important technology becomes the subject of a
contentious patent dispute among some of the world's highest esteemed research institutions.Nonetheless-despite claims that the CRISPR.patent dispute is a unique
event-there are some greater lessons to be learned about the ethical, legal, and social
implications of intellectual property in research science.
The first, and perhaps most important for day-to-day scientific practice, is
that patents-their promises and pitfalls-should not ruin research collaborations.
Science, and molecular biology in particular, is largely a team sport.83 Researchers
seeking to make the most significant advances in their fields must increasingly turn
to others at the fringe of their disciplines for help. 84 In biology, this is perhaps best
exemplified by the recent explosion of collaboration between molecular geneticists and
computer scientists, the informational yields of which have been tremendous.85 Even
in the CRISPR context itself, it's worth reiterating that the two warring factions made
their advances through collaborative efforts, despite patent disputes within research
groups: Doudna with Charpentier; and Zhang with Luciano Marraffini of Rockefeller
80

The BioBrick User Agreement, BioBricks Foundation, https: //biobricks.org/ bpa/ users/agreemen t/
[https:/ /perma.cc/Y6HD -9WXA] (accessed Nov. 13, 20 17) [hereinafter BUA]; see also D avid Singh
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STAN. T ECH. L. R.Ev. 143, 180- 187 (2017) (exhaustively describing the BUA and its implications).
SI BUA, supra note 80 .
82 Although CRJSPR' s magnitude, as a biological tool, is not unique. Recombinant DNA, the discovery ofhESCs,
and the engineering of monoclonal antib odies have similarly challenged law, science, and ethics when they
were first announced. See generally GEORGE CHURCH AND ED REGIS, Rf.GENESIS: HOW SYNETHETIC BIOLOGY
WILL REINVENT N ATURE AND OURSELVES (20 12) (discussing each of these technologies and their impact on
synthetic biology).
83 Janet D. Stemwedel, The Objectivity Tlzing (Or, Why Science Is a Team Sport), Ser. AM., July 20, 2011,
https: / / blogs.scien tificamerican.com / doing-good-science/h ttpblogsscientificamericancomdoing-goodscience20 110720the-objectivity-thing-or-why-science-is-a-team-sport/
[https: / / perma.cc/ ENR9-SDYE J
(accessedNov.13,2017).
84 See J acob S. Sherkow, Negativing Invention, 2011 BYU L. REV. 109 1, 1118- 19 (describing the innovation trend
to combine widely disparate fields of art).
85 Minoru Kanehisa & Peer Bork, Bioinformatics in the Post-Sequence Era, 33 NAT. GENET. 305, 305 (2003) (discussing the rise ofbioinformatics as a scientific discipline); Saurabh Vishnubhakat & Arti K. Rai, When Biopharma Meets Software: Bioinformatics at the Patent Office, 29 HARV. L. J. & TECH. 206, 206- 07 (describing th e
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University. 86 CRISPRresearch has now largely become international in scope despite
a thicket of global and interinstitutional patent issues.87 It is doubtful that further advances could be made without such teams. Patent incentives should not act as collaborative disincentives.
Another lesson to be drawn is the potential power of scientists-not just
lawyers-over the use and abuses of their patents. Researchers often have some significant say in how their home institutions can use their patented technology-from
who should receive a license to the royalty rate and terms set for competitors. 88
Indeed, academic inventors are frequently the founders or co-owners of spinout companies to whom their institutions farm out patent sublicensing work. 89 Doudna, for example, is the co-founder of Caribou Biosciences, the University of California's patent
surrogate; Charpentier, CRISPR Therapeutics; and Zhang, Editas Medicine.90 Inventor researchers with academic spinouts therefore have some control in how their technologywill ultimately be used. Scientists with careers otherwise dedicated to the greater
good should leverage this power; they should engage with and negotiate with their institutions to responsibly develop the fruits of their efforts. They should not abandon
these concerns to university administrators or their companies' shareholders.
Lastly, the ethical, legal, and social implications of the CRISPR patents have something to say about academic patenting, in general. Currently, a great deal of the academic literature on IP paints patents with a normative brush-patents are 'good';
patents are 'bad'. 91 More nuanced, economically sophisticated discussions of these positions cast them in terms of efficiency.92 But the CRISPR patent controversies teaches
us that patents, like kitchen knives, are simply tools, without a moral valence separate from their users. Patents, like the CRISPR patents, can be used in ways that impede further research.93 Or, they can be used to promote, if not demand, their ethical
application. 94 The patents themselves do not do these things; the outcomes depend
86
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87 Egelie et al., supra note 18, at 1030- 31.
88 See Jason Owen-Smith & Walter W. Powell, To Patent or Not: Faculty Decisions and Institutional Success at
Technology Transfer, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 99, 106 (2001) (describing concerns of academic scientists over
use of their patented technology); Lynne G . Zucker & Michael R. Darby, Star Scientists and Institutional Transformation: Patterns of fovention and Innovation in the Formation of the Biotechnology Industry, 93 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. Sci. USA 709, 709 ( 1996) (examining that faculty input of star scientists is a significant factor affecting
technology transfer offices' decision to create spinouts).
89 See Jorge L. Contreras & Charles R. McManis, Catalyzing Technology Development I11rough University Research,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 237 (Joshua D. Sarnoff ed. 2016)
(describing the creation of spinouts).
90 About Us, CRIS PR THERAPEUTICS, http: / / www.crisprtx.com/ about-us/ scientific-founders-advisors.php
[https:/ /perma.cc/ T7UB-MKYN) (accessed Nov. 13, 2017); Origins, CARIBOU
BIOSCIENCES,
http://cariboubio.com/origins [https://perma.cc/SMH8-7KHU] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017); Our Team,
EDITAS MEDICINE, http:/ /www.editasmedicine.com/ our-team [https: / /perma.cc/UA2W-AUFY] (accessed
Nov. 13, 2017).
91 See Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 1331 (2015) (casting the academic literature in these normative terms) .
92 See Id. at 1332- 35 (describing some of the economic literature on the 'patent system', writ large).
93 Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 21, at 698.
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entirely on who's wielding them. To that end, the CRISPR patent controversies should
encourage researchers to think about how, and by whom, their inventions will ultimately be used-both for those seeking to use them for good or for ill.
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